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July 1968 This booklet is  based on a series of lectures given  by 
Johannes Jansen,  Head of the Indirect Taxation Division, 
Commission of the European Communities Tax harmonization and the Rome Treaty 
Like all  other modern states, the six  member countries of 
the European Community today use  taxes  not merely  to 
raise revenue but also to stabilize their economies and to 
facilitate  social change.  Their tax systems vary, of course, 
because of differences in their economic and social policies 
and in the practical conditions of collecting taxes. However, 
taxation  has  become  such  an  important  instrument  in 
shaping business and living conditions that some measures 
of alignment of the  six  member countries'  tax policies  is 
unavoidable  if they  are  to  achieve  the  economic  union 
described in the Rome Treaty. 
The  Treaty  itself  contains  only  one  clause  which  ex-
plicitly mentions tax harmonization. This is Article 99, and 
even  here  the  only  reference  is  to  the  harmonization  of 
indirect taxes,  the most important of which  are turnover 
(i.e.  sales)  taxes  and excise  duties.  Article  99  requires the 
Commission to propose to the Council of Ministers ways of 
harmonizing national legislation on indirect taxes in so far 
as this is in the interests of the Common Market. 
The fact that the Rome Treaty does not explicitly mention 
the harmonization of direct taxes - such as income tax and 
corporation tax - does not justify the conclusion that there 
is no basis in the Treaty for this to be done. The authority 
for action in the field  of direct taxation can be found in a 
general clause (Article 100) which instructs the Commission 
to propose directives to the Council for the "approximation 
of those provisions imposed by law, regulation or admini-
strative  action  in member  states  as  directly  affecting  the 
setting up or operation of the Common Market". Article 
100 therefore implicitly covers harmonization of  direct taxes. 
It seems  clear from  the marked difference  between  the 
approach to harmonization  of indirect  taxes  on the  one 
hand, and of direct taxes on the other, that the authors of 
the Rome Treaty regarded harmonization of turnover taxes 
and excise  duties as a matter of primary importance. The 
Commission  has  therefore  from  the  outset  given  high 
priority to the  harmonization of indirect taxes,  and par-
ticularly of turnover taxes. 
The Treaty lays down that economic union  be  brought 
about through a customs union. It is therefore logical that, 
as tariffs are removed, emphasis should be placed on other 
import levies  which  may  have  effects  similar  to those  of 
customs  duties.  Turnover taxes  and excise  duties  are  the 
most obvious examples. 
3 Turnover taxes 
Turnover taxes are taxes on consumption: they are added 
to the price of the taxable products. They are levied accord-
ing to the "country-of-destination" principle (in contrast to 
the "country-of-origin" principle). This means that exports 
are exempted from  turnover tax and the tax already paid 
on them  in  the exporting  country is  reimbursed.  On the 
other hand, imported commodities have to be taxed in the 
same way as similar domestic products. In other words, tax 
adjustments  have  to be  applied  at the  frontier  to ensure 
that the same tax is  levied on imported goods as  on com-
parable domestic products. 
Since  the customs  union in the  Community came  into 
effect on July 1,  1968, trade between the member countries 
has been free  of customs duties, but indirect taxes are still 
levied  and  reimbursed,  and  physical  controls  are  still 
carried out at the Community's internal frontier. 
These export rebates (or drawbacks) and import-equaliza-
tion taxes could easily  be  used for purposes incompatible 
with  one  of the main objectives  of the Common Market, 
namely  free,  undistorted  competition.  For instance,  if a 
higher compensatory tax were  levied  on imports than the 
tax  on  comparable  home-produced  merchandise,  the 
difference  would  have  the  same  protective  effect  as  the 
customs duties that had been abolished. If  the export rebate 
were  too  high,  then  the  difference  would  amount  to  an 
export subsidy, which is prohibited. 
·To prevent this type of discrimination, Articles 95 and 96 
of the Treaty stipulate that the indirect tax on imports must 
not be higher than that which would be charged on similar 
domestic  products,  and that the  export  rebate  must  not 
exceed  the  amount  of tax  actually  paid.  Experience  has 
shown that these  prohibitions are very difficult to enforce 
properly in the Community, at least as far as turnover taxes 
are concerned. 
Existing turnover-tax systems 
There is  a great disparity in the existing turnover-tax laws 
of  the  six  Community  countries,  not  only  because  of 
differing  financial  and  tax  policies,  but also  because  of 
differences  in  the  practical  conditions  of  enforcement. 
However, the six systems can be reduced to three categories. 
1. First,  there  are  the  cumulative,  multi-stage  "cascade" 
systems used in Germany (until the end of 1967),  Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands (where, however, the tax is not 
levied  at the  retail  stage).  Under  this  system  the  tax  is 
levied  on the gross  value of output at each stage of pro-
duction. 
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2. Secondly, there is the tax on value added, a non-cumula-
tive, multi-stage system, which has been applied in France. 
This is a tax levied only on the net value (tax on gross out-
put minus tax on the cost of all materials used). 
3. Finally, there are the mixed systems. These are basically 
cumulative  multi-stage  systems  applied  down  to  and 
including  the  wholesale  stage,  but  incorporating  taxes 
applied  at a  single  point  for  some  goods.  These  mixed 
systems have been used in Belgium and Italy. 
In  a  cumulative  multi-stage  system,  the  tax  liability 
accrues  at  each  stage  in  the  course  of production  and 
distribution, i.e.  every time a product changes hands. As a 
consequence, it is never possible to know how much turn-
over tax has been paid on a product at any given point in 
the  production  or distribution  process,  for  this  depends 
entirely  on how  many stages  the  product itself,  its  com-
ponents,  and  the  equipment  and  services  utilized  have 
passed through. Even in a single industrial sector this can 
vary considerably from product to product. 
At each taxable point, the tax paid accumulates on top 
of the  tax levied  at earlier  stages.  This  so-called  cascade 
effect results in a lower total tax burden on goods produced 
and  distributed  in  a  short  than  those  subject  to  a  long 
production chain. Consequently, the cascade effect benefits 
vertically-integrated  concerns.  It  also  constitutes  a  tax 
obstacle  to  specialization  of production  (which  may  be 
desirable  on economic  grounds),  because  each  extra link 
in the economic  process leads  to extra taxation.  Cascade 
systems,  then,  are not economically neutral.  They distort 
competition  in  internal  as  well  as  in  international trade. 
As noted above, Articles 95 and 96 of the Treaty restrict 
the  amount  of compensatory  taxes  on  imports  and  of 
rebates on exports. But as these amounts cannot be deter-
mined  accurately  in  cascade  systems,  Article  97  permits 
countries with cascade systems to use average tax rates as a 
temporary measure.  Even if accurately calculated, average 
rates must, by definition, give rise to discrimination because 
a domestic product on which the tax actually paid is  less 
than the average  rate has an automatic and unwarranted 
advantage over an imported product.  On the other hand, 
exports have an advantage on foreign markets if  the average 
rate of rebate exceeds the amount of tax actually paid on 
any one product. 
· In the early days of the Common Market, this problem 
was not serious. If  the turnover tax on imports was too low, 
it  was  usually  supplemented  by  an  import  duty  which normally provided a big enough margin - although at the 
expense of its protective function - to offset the advantage 
of the low compensatory tax. 
However, the situation changed as import duties between 
the Six  began to disappear.  Insufficient turnover taxes  on 
imports were  increasingly  regarded as  placing imports  at 
an  unfair  competitive  advantage.  For  this  reason,  most 
governments concerned gradually increased their compen-
satory rates. 
These  border  tax  adjustments  can  cause  considerable 
problems. It is  difficult  in practice  to check  whether  the 
limits  prescribed  in Articles  95  and 96  have  been  over-
stepped. But even where these increases cannot be held to 
conflict with the letter of the Treaty clauses, their effects, 
which  can be  compared  with  changes  in  a  country's ex-
change  rate,  give  rise  to  serious  objections.  Repeated 
alterations in these price components are a factor of great 
uncertainty  for  international  trade,  since  they  vary  the 
competitive position of products. 
Constant increases in the compensatory taxes on imports 
and  the  reimbursement  on  exports  do  not  affect  intra-
Community trade alone,  but are just as harmful to trade 
with countries outside the Community, so that non-member 
countries,  too,  have  every interest in seeing  a  stable  and 
neutral competitive situation attained as soon as possible. 
The choice of the added-value method 
To  eliminate  these  fiscal  distortions ·of competition,  the 
Council of Ministers decided on April11, 1967, to institute 
a common turnover tax system based on the added-value 
method of taxation.  Later on,  the tax rates  will  also  be 
harmonized.  The  decision  was  made in the form. of two 
directives  to the member states  which  leave  the  national 
governments free to decide how to incorporate the system 
into their legislation.  Other directives  will  later complete 
the harmonization. 
The  first  directive  outlines  the  general  program  for 
turnover tax harmonization, the methods of accomplishing 
it, and its purposes. 
Its aims are: 
to remove fiscal distortions of competition by instituting 
the common added-value-tax (AVT) system by January 1, 
1970;  ' 
to eliminate tax frontiers between the member countries 
in a second stage of harmonization. 
By 1970, when all six Community members have switched 
over  to  the  common  A  VT  system,  comparable  products 
in each EEC country will be subject to the same system of 
turnover tax (even if rates applied vary),  and exact com-
pensatory measures will be possible in both intra-Community 
trade and trade with  the rest  of the world.  Nonetheless, 
compensatory  import levies  and export  rebates  will  still 
exist after January 1,  1970,  in trade between the member 
countries, because the first  stage of harmonization merely 
introduces  a  common  tax  system.  Within  the  common 
system, each member country will decide its own tax rates 
and tax exemptions.  As long as  differences  remain in the 
effective tax loads between the Six, there will still have to be 
equalization at the Community's internal frontiers in order 
to prevent distortion of competition. 
These  tax frontiers  will  be  removed  during the second 
phase. No time limit has been specified for the beginning of 
this stage; but, according to the first directive, the Commis-
sion must by the end of 1968  submit to a Council a draft 
directive specifying the action needed to remove tax fron-
tiers, and stating how and when it should be done. 
Why was a common system prescribed for the first phase 
of harmonization? This is a matter of some significance. 
Economic neutrality, the first objective of harmonization, 
could just as  well  have  been  achieved  had each  country 
simply  introduced  a  neutral  system  of its  own  choice. 
France could have kept the A  VT  system it had, and the 
countries  that  had  cascade-systems  could  have  selected 
from  among various types  of non-cumulative and neutral 
turnover taxes the one best suiting their needs. 
The  European  Commission,  in  fact,  did  suggest  this 
approach  at first,  but the  Finance  Ministers  rejected  it 
because only a common system could eliminate tax frontiers. 
Furthermore, the Ministers were reluctant to have to amend 
their legislation drastically  twice  within a  relatively  short 
period - first,  to replace their current systems  by neutral 
systems  and then,  a  few  years  later,  to  replace  the  new 
system by a harmonized common system. The Commission 
therefore  proposed  that  a  common  system  be  instituted 
right away. 
Four criteria governed the choice of  this system. It  had to: 
•  affect competition as little as possible; 
•  facilitate subsequent elimination of tax frontiers; 
•  guarantee a relatively high tax yield; 
•  work in such a· way as to enable all member countries to 
administer and collect the taxes due. 
The Six  agreed that the common system would have to 
be a general tax on consumption, normally payable on all 
goods and on services.  (There is,  therefore, a considerable 
5 difference between such a tax and the British purchase tax, 
which  is  levied  on certain  goods  only  and not at all  on 
services.) 
The experts considered and rejected three possible types 
of turnover  tax  system.  A  single-point  retail  tax,  which 
would have been ideal as regards neutrality and elimination 
of frontiers, would have put the whole turnover tax burden 
on the retailer, economically the weakest link in the chain 
of distribution and at the most difficult point of collection. 
It would  also  have  meant a  relatively  high  rate of tax in 
the member countries - in France, for instance, about 20 
per cent. 
A  second  possibility  was  a  single-stage  wholesale  tax, 
corresponding to British purchase tax as  regards methods 
of collection. This would have created equal conditions of 
competition in the production and wholesale stages, but its 
impact on consumer prices could have varied with retailers' 
profit margins.  However,  the main  objection - as  with  a 
retail tax - was a practical one: tax evasion.  Most member 
countries thought it too risky to levy a relatively high turn-
over tax at only one point. 
The third possibility,  a single-stage production tax,  was 
rejected for similar reasons. 
A  system  of taxation  on  value  added  was  therefore 
finally  accepted. The second Council directive outlines the 
structure of the common A  VT and its application. 
How th  added-value tax works 
Collection of an A  VT levied down to the retail stage can 
best  be  explained  by  comparison  with  a  single-stage  tax 
levied only on retail transactions. If  the rate is  10 per cent, 
the retailer pays a tax of £10 on a turnover of £100. 
With a  10  per cent tax on the value added, the retailer 
takes  10  per cent  of his· turnover and deducts from  that 
amount the taxes  his  suppliers  have  already paid on the 
goods  and  invoiced  to  him.  If the  retailer's  purchases 
amounted to £80 of  his £100 turnover, then he would owe the 
tax collector £2 (10 per cent of  £100 less 10 per cent of £80). 
This amount corresponds to 10 per cent of £20,  the value 
added by the retailer to the product. As with the single-stage 
system, he will have to pass on to his customers the full  10 
per cent of £100 in order to recover the amount in tax that 
he  has  paid - indirectly,  through  his  suppliers,  £8,  and 
directly to the tax authorities, £2.  The tax is levied in the 
same  way  at the  wholesale  level,  and at all  the  steps  in 
production before the wholesaler. (See Annex 1). 
The tax liability is  thus spread over every stage through 
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which a product passes before reaching the consumer. What 
the tax authorities  collect in one amount under a  single-
stage retail tax has the same incidence as an A  VT levied up 
to the retail  stage.  In either case,  the retail price is  taxed 
only  once,  so  that both systems  are  non-cumulative  and 
neutral with regard to competition. The only real difference 
consists in the methods of collection: at one point, in the 
case of the retail tax, and spread over all stages in the case 
of AVT. 
It is generally agreed that if the scope of the tax is made 
as wide as possible, the A  VT system represents the optimum 
in simplicity and economic neutrality. The scope of the tax 
should therefore extend from the first  stage of production 
to the last stage of  distribution. If  the retail trade is excluded, 
retailers  might  bypass  wholesalers  and  go  directly  to 
manufacturers to save  the  tax on the  value  added at the 
wholesale stage. 
Practical,  political,  or  psychological  reasons  in  some 
countries make it difficult to include the retail trade in the 
tax system.  This is  why  the Council's directive makes the 
common  system  compulsory  to the  wholesale  level  only, 
and  lets  the  member  states  decide  whether  to  include 
retailers or to levy a separate supplementary tax on retailers. 
Investigations  have  shown  that  different  treatment  of 
retailers  in the six  countries  need not necessarily  lead to 
substantial distortions of competition in  intra-EEC trade. 
The added-value tax after 1970 
Although a single added-value tax system will  be  in force 
throughout the Community on January 1,  1970,  this field 
of  tax  harmonization  will  not  be  complete.  Member 
countries will still be free to decide whether the A  VT should 
be applied to retail trade and to a large part of the service 
sector.  Only  a  limited  number  of services,  namely  those 
that directly  affect  production  and distribution - among 
them, the transfer of patents and trade marks, advertising, 
and transport and storage of products - must be subjected 
to the common A  VT. 
The member countries will have the option of imposing 
A  VT on all other services, such as those normally supplied 
to private individuals only (for example by doctors, banks, 
and hairdressers).  Memb~r states may also work out their 
own provisions,  depending  on national requirements  and 
practical  circumstances,  for  the  application  of A  VT  to  • 
small businesses.  · 
However,  selection  of tax  rates  is  the  most  important 
freedom left to the member countries during the first phase of harmonization. So even after January 1,  1970, there will 
still be considerable differences  between the six  countries' 
standard  and higher  or lower  rates,  and the  exemptions 
they grant'. The normal rate on January 1,  1970, is likely to 
be roughly 20 per cent in France and Belgium;  10-12 per 
cent in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy; and 9-10 per 
cent in Luxembourg. 
There are also other areas where harmonization need not 
yet be applied, and where the member countries are entitled 
to provide  for  national  regulations.  The  most important 
instance  is  that,  when  economic  considerations  warrant 
such action, every member country is free,  after consulting 
the Commission  and the other member countries,  to dis-
allow some or alL of the tax deductions for expenditure on 
capital goods or to allow deduction for this equipment by 
annual instalments only. 
During a transitional period after the A  VT is introduced, 
the member countries may - even without prior consulta-
tions - restrict  tax deductions for expenditure  on capital 
goods. Germany, in fact, did so in its new AVT law which 
came into force on January 1,  1968. The German restriction 
- a temporary one - was necessary on budgetary grounds, 
and  was  also  intended  to  prevent  a  temporary  halt  to 
investment before the A  VT was introduced. 
The added-value tax and international trade 
As  long  as  each  of the  Community  countries  applies  a 
different A  VT rate,  set at a level  that maintains ·the total 
incidence of the preceding cumulative turnover tax, imports 
from abroad into these countries will, under the new A  VT 
system,  be taxed at the same rate as  similar products pro-
duced in these countries. In countries with a cascade system 
where  compensatory taxes  on imports  were  too low,  the 
introduction of the  A  VT  will  mean  that imported goods 
will  lose  their  unwarranted  competitive  advantage.  Con-
versely, exports from those EEC countries to non-member 
countries  will  lose  the  competitive  disadvantages  from 
which  they  may  have  suffered  because  of an inadequate 
rebate under the cascade system. Competitive conditions in 
foreign markets will also be equalized in trade between the 
EEC countries themselves. 
These effects will not, however, always be felt immediately, 
because governments are likely to take transitional measures 
for budgetary reasons. In Germany, for instance, stocks of 
merchandise  and capital goods  existing  on December  31, 
1967,  were  not completely relieved from the old turnover 
tax  paid  on  them.  Moreover,  the  AVT  paid  on  capital 
goods bought during the first five years after the introduction 
of the new system in Germany is  only partially deductible. 
These  measures  will,  during  the  depreciation  period  for 
capital goods, involve a supplementary charge on German 
products which will  neither be reimbursed on exports nor 
equalized  for  imports.  German experts  estimate  that this 
extra charge could increase the overall German price level 
by about 1· 5 per cent in 1968 and 1 per cent in 1969. This 
supplementary charge will  gradually disappear.  Obviously 
this price rise  has reduced or even neutralized any advan-
tages  German  industry  could  otherwise  have  expected 
from the introduction of the AVT. 
Aligning added-value tax rates 
The second phase of tax harmonization will  eliminate tax 
frontiers between the Community's member countries after 
common A  VT  rates have  been introduced.  The effects  of 
this will  be much more serious, both on trade among the 
member  countr~es themselves and on their trade with non-
member countries.  No timetable for this has yet been set. 
One of the first  consequences of the alignment of A  VT 
rates is  that the member countries will  have  to surrender 
virtually  all  their  sovereignty  in  turnover  taxation.  The 
opportunity  to  use  turnover  taxes  for  purely  national 
economic and social aims will  then be minimal:  countries 
will retain their freedom of action only in certain areas (in 
the retail trade, perhaps, and services  to private persons). 
The repercussions on the national fiscal  pattern and on 
the tax burden should also be radical in several Community 
countries. Depending on whether the overall burden is now 
lighter or heavier than the burden of the common rate, the 
introduction of a  common rate will  result in a  higher or 
lower  yield  from  the  turnover  tax  and  a  corresponding 
increase or decrease in the tax burden. 
The level of the common rate is not yet fixed, but it might 
be in the region of 15 per cent. In that case, introducing a 
common rate would increase the burden of turnover tax in 
Germany;  the  Netherlands,  Luxembourg  and  Italy,  and 
reduce it in France and Belgium.  The first three countries 
could therefore lower direct taxes while France and Belgium 
would need to raise them.  Italy would be  able to abolish 
many of its special taxes on production and consumption. 
Harmonization of turnover taxes  could thus  constitute 
an  important  step  towards  bringing  into  line  the  ratio 
between direct and indirect taxes in the six member coun-
tries. (See Annex II). This would help to ensure equal con-
ditions of competition. 
7 Excise duties 
Although harmonization of turnover taxes  is  being given 
priority,  other  taxes  will  also  have  to  be  aligned  if the 
envisaged  economic union is  to come into  effect,  and in 
1967 the Commission put before the Council a program to 
this end. 
Because  the  "country-of-destination"  principle  also 
applies to excise taxes,  there is,  as with turnover taxes,  a 
tax rebate on exports, and a duty on imports. The present 
measures are by no means always compatible with Articles 95 
and  96  of the  Rome  Treaty,  which  ban  discriminatory 
treatment  based  on  the  origin  of products  because  they 
often do discriminate against imported products. Some of 
these forms  of discrimination have been abolished at the 
insistence of the Commission, but a number of others can 
be eliminated only by harmonizing the method of  collection. 
If  tax frontiers between the member states are to be com-
pletely  dismantled,  rates  of excise  duties  will  have  to be 
brought into line. 
At  present  excise  duties  are  extremely  disparate.  The 
number of duties also varies appreciably from one country 
to another. Consultations between the Commission and the 
Direct taxes 
In 1967 the European Commission submitted to the Council 
a memorandum setting out the harmonization program for 
direct taxes. The economic and social aims of this program 
are: 
1.  To ensure  that the  effects  of taxation  on the  cost  of 
production and on the yield on invested capital do not 
differ  too  widely  between  one  member  country  and 
another. 
2.  To ensure that capital movements depend on economic 
rather than on fiscal factors. 
3.  To eliminate tax obstacles to mergers and to the setting-
up of European companies - and so help firms adjust to 
the larger scale of the Common Market, and hold their 
own against increasing competition in world markets. 
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Permanent Committee of heads of revenue departments in 
the member countries have produced agreement in principle 
on the way  in which  excise  duties  could  be  harmonized. 
Common excise duties would be levied on a limited number 
of items, in particular manufactured tobacco, spirits, beer, 
petroleum  products,  and  perhaps  wine  and  sugar.  The 
Commission  thinks  that  collection  methods  should  be 
harmonized  as  soon  as  possible.  The  harmonization  of 
rates,  which  is  normally essential for the removal  of tax 
frontiers, would come later, perhaps at the same time as the 
harmonization of turnover-tax rates. 
A second category of existing excise duties- for instance 
those on salt, matches, playing cards and certain tropical 
products such as  tea and coffee  - could be  abolished or 
incorporated in the common A  VT. 
A  third category of unimportant excise  duties  that are 
purely local and do not affect trade between the member 
countries would not need to be harmonized. So far, a draft 
regulation for the harmonization of tobacco excise  duties 
has  been  submitted to the  Council.  Working parties,  in-
cluding government experts, are studying the other duties. 
4.  To  coordinate  fiscal  policies  of the  member  states  -
especially  the  use  of  taxation  as  an  instrument  of 
economic and social policy - and bring them into line 
with the Community's policies. 
Each tax must be considered in the context of the overall 
tax structure, which should not be distorted by too many 
adaptations  to  special  situations.  At the  same  time,  tax 
harmonization  should  leave  the  member  states  sufficient 
autonomy  and  room  for  manoeuvre  in  their  budgetary 
policy to influence, if necessary,  their national economies 
in the framework of the Community policy. 
Tax harmonization will,  of course,  serve  little  purpose 
unless the methods of  inspection, verification and cqllection 
are also harmonized. Three sources of revenue 
In  the  opmton  of the  European  Commission,  the  tax 
revenue of the six  EEC countries should, in the long run, 
be based mainly on three sources: 
1.  The harmonized added-value tax, plus a limited number 
of harmonized excise duties. 
2.  A corporation tax, which would have the same structure 
and similar rates throughout the Community. 
3.  A personal income tax whose rate might differ, even in 
the long run, from one member country to the other. 
Harmonization of direct taxation therefore affects mainly 
company profits  and dividends.  In the long term a single 
tax system for profits would be needed. 
There  are,  however,  some  problems  which  have  to  be 
solved soon. These questions are dealt with in a short-term 
program  divided  into  three  chapters:  ensuring  the  free 
movement of capital; facilitating industrial concentration; 
and  avoiding  the  distortion  of  competition  caused  by 
different tax rules for depreciation of capital goods. 
Fre  dom of capital movement 
The  Commission  points  out  that  to  overcome  the  frag-
mentation of capital markets and to create a free, common 
capital  market,  the  international  double  taxation  of 
dividends  and interest must be  eliminated.  So,  too,  must 
all fiscal  factors likely to cause "abnormal" capital move-
ments,  that is  to  say,  movements  springing  from  causes 
other than traditional economic or financial considerations. 
The Commission therefore proposes, first,  the extension 
and  improvement  of the  existing  inadequate  network  of 
bilateral  conventions  for  the  avoidance  of international 
double taxation on interest and dividends. This would pave 
the  way  to  the  conclusion  of a  multilateral  convention 
between the Six. 
A second step is the establishment of a single method of 
relief from "economic double taxation" of dividends, which 
are taxed first as  company profits, and then as part of the 
income  of  the  individual  shareholder.  At  present  two 
methods  are  practised  within  the  Community.  Germany 
applies a reduced rate of  company income tax for distributed 
profits.  France  and  Belgium,  on the  contrary,  grant  the 
relief within the scope of personal income tax.  They allow 
the shareholder to deduct from his  personal income tax a 
part of the corporation tax paid by  the firm  distributing 
the dividends. 
The  other  member  states  (the  Netherlands,  Italy  and 
Luxembourg) have no measures to avoid this form of  double 
taxation.  The  present  French  and  Belgium  systems  will 
need to be modified soon because they allow this tax relief 
to  residents  only  and,  moreover,  solely  for  dividends 
distributed by companies established in the country itself. 
Obviously,  this  makes  it more  attractive  for  French and 
Belgian investors to buy shares in national companies than 
in companies established in the other member states. At the 
same  time,  residents  from  other  member  countries  are 
discriminated  against  if they hold  shares  in  French  and 
Belgian  companies.  This  situation is  clearly  incompatible 
with the principle of free movement of capital. 
The Commission proposes, thirdly, that the very different 
arrangements for withholding at source the tax on dividends 
and bond interest should be harmonized. The existing tax 
situation varies from country to country, and in one and 
the same member country, according to the country where 
the income arises, and sometimes according to whether the 
income is collected in that or in another country. 
The European Commission suggests that common rates 
for tax withheld at source in the Community be introduced. 
It  regards a rate of 25 per cent as feasible for dividends. For 
bond interest, a lower rate - say a maximum of 10 per cent -
could be applied. 
Any tax withheld at source would have to be deducted in 
full from the beneficiary's income tax and be reimbursed to 
the extent that it exceeded the beneficiary's tax liability. The 
Commission stresses the need to simplify the numerous and 
complicated formalities which must at present be complied 
with to avoid international double taxation. 
The Commission also suggests that a member state could 
be  authorized  to refrain from  levying  the  common with-
holding tax on dividends paid to its residents, provided that 
the shareholder's tax office is informed immediately by the 
paying agency. This is the current practice in France, where 
withholding  tax  is  levied  only  on  dividends  paid  to 
foreigners. 
Two  other  measures  proposed  in  connection  with  the 
establishment of a free  capital market are the removal of 
tax  rules  which  handicap  investment trusts  and funds  in 
comparison with direct investments, and an examination of 
the present tax arrangements to which holding companies 
are subject, to see if they can be harmonized. 
Helping company m  rg  rs 
The  removal  of fiscal  obstacles  to  company  mergers  is 
necessary  to facilitate,  or at all events not to hinder, the 
growth and modernization of firms. At present, mergers are 
generally  impeded  by  the  fiscal  cost  of the  transaction 
:9 itself,  while  the  acquisition  of a  shareholding in another 
company  is  discouraged  by  the  tax  rules  subsequently 
applicable to the parent company and its subsidiaries. 
In order to create  equal conditions  of competition for 
investments, the Commission proposes, to begin with, that 
the basic rules for depreciation of fixed  assets  be  harmo-
nized. These rules are an important element in the assessment 
of the  tax  on  company  profits.  Before  member  states 
introduce  special  depreciation  provisions  liable  to  con-
stitute particular incentives to investment, they will have to 
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consult  the  Commission  and  the  other  member  states. 
National investment incentives not in line with the general 
policy defined by the Community institutions are undesir-
able, the Commission points out. 
In the longer term, a harmonized definition and method 
of calculation of taxable profits must be adopted.  To this 
end, the Commission's proposals for the depreciation rules 
will have to be supplemented by common provisions for the 
appreciation in value of  fixed assets, the valuation of  stocks, 
the carrying-forward of losses and tax-exempted reserves. Annex 1:  Invoicing under the added-value tax system 
The simple example below  illustrates how one firm  invoices  another 
under the A  VT system. Assume that: 
A sells  B sheet-metal for £100; 
From this material B manufactures kitchen utensils, which he then 
sells to C, a wholesaler, for £200; 
•  C then resells these utensils to D, a retailer, for £250; 
The rate of A  VT is  20%. 
A invoices B (manufacturer). A invoices B £100 plus 20% A  VT =  £120. 
A receives £120, £20 of which he pays to the revenue authorities. 
B invoices C (wholesaler). The price paid by B can be broken down like 
this: £100 (price before tax) plus £20 (tax which he has paid, and which 
is passed on by A to the revenue authorities). 
B's invoice to C is  £200  (i.e.  £100  purchase price plus £100  value 
added) plus 20% A  VT = £240. B receives £240, £40 of which is added-
value tax. But since A has already paid £20 to the revenue authorities, 
B only pays the difference, i.e. £40 less £20  =  £20. 
C invoices D  (retailer). The price paid by C can be broken down as 
£200 (price before tax) plus £40 (tax which he has paid to Band which 
is passed on by the latter to the revenue authorities). 
C's invoice to D amounts to £250 (i.e. £200 purchase price plus £50 
value added) plus 20% A  VT = £300. C pays to the revenue authorities: 
£50 less £40 paid by A and B =  £10. 
This example shows that the revenue authorities received £20 from 
A, £20 from B and £10 from C.  The total, £50, corresponds to 20% 
of the final selling price, £250. 
How is AVT levied? 
In practice, payments and deductions of tax are not effected at the time 
of each transaction, but all together at the end of a given period. Let 
us suppose that this period is  one calendar month - as it is,  in fact, 
in the A  VT systems applied in France and Germany and recommended 
by the Community authorities.  During this month the taxpayer will 
record, in two columns: 
1.  His purchases and, opposite, the tax paid to suppliers; 
2.  His sales and, opposite, the tax received from customers. 
If  the sum of the tax received exceeds that of the tax paid, the tax-
payer will owe the revenue authorities the difference. If  the sum of the 
tax paid exceeds that of the tax received, then they will owe him the 
difference. If, for instance, the monthly total of the tax paid on pur-
chases amounts to £80 and that of the tax received from sales to £100, 
the taxpayer will pay the revenue authorities £100 less £80  =  £20. 
This  system  differs  from  the cumulative  multistage  or "cascade" 
system where tax is  paid by sticking revenue stamps on the invoices 
after completing each  transaction.  Under  the  A  VT  system,  the tax 
is paid as a lump sum on all the transactions carried out during the 
given period of time. This process therefore involves the submission at 
set periods - monthly, in our example - of a detailed tax declaration, 
together  with  payment  if the  balance  is  in  favour  of the  revenue 
authorities. 
What ism  ant by ·deduction•? 
The French and German schemes authorize the taxpayer to deduct the 
tax which has been levied on certain goods from the A  VT he owes. 
There are two types of deduction: 
1.  Deductions for  purchases  and imports of raw  materials  and for 
products  which  are required in  the composition or manufacture of 
goods liable to AVT, or which lose their individual properties in the 
course of a manufacturing process. Deductions can also be made on 
work done for production of these goods. 
2.  Deductions  on  purchases,  imports  and  deliveries  of goods  and 
services  - other than those mentioned under (1)  above- which are 
acquired for operational purposes. 
This category includes: 
•  Investments  in  industrial  fixed  assets:  workshops,  warehouses, 
drawing and study offices,  accommodation for social services; 
•  Investments in movable assets:  industrial plant; machinery;  pro-
duction or handling appliances; typewriters, and calculating, invoicing 
and  photocopying  machines;  drawing  boards;  typing  tables,  filing 
cabinets;  teleprinters;  essential social-service equipment; spare parts 
and supplies  for  repair  and maintenance  of goods  eligible  for  tax 
deductions; 
•  General expenses for heating and lighting industrial, administrative 
and commercial buildings; production costs (energy, working clothes); 
marketing expenses (publicity, samples); 
•  Cost of services,  such as  bank charges,  transport costs,  expenses 
arising from the renting of factories or material, publicity costs. 
How are these deductions made? Suppose that, during a given month, 
a manufacturer invoiced supplies to his customers for a total of £5,000. 
If the A  VT rate is 20%, he would invoice £5,000 plus 20% =  £6,000. 
He therefore owes the revenue authorities the tax he has received, 
i.e. £1,000.  But he may make the following deductions: 
1.  In the  course  of the  month  he  purchased  raw  material  costing 
£2,000, on which he paid £400 tax. This tax is immediately deductible 
in its entirety. 
2.  During the  same  month he  acquired  a  machine  valued  at £900 
which was subject to £180 tax. This tax will only be deductible piece-
meal,  according  to  the  way  in  which  the  value  of the  machine  is 
depreciated.  If depreciation  is  spread  over  a  five-year  period,  the 
amount deductible each year will  be: 
£180  =  £36 a year,  or £3  a month. 
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At the end of the month, the manufacturer will  therefore owe the 
revenue authorities: 
£1,000 less £400 and less £3  = £597. 
Deductions  are  not,  however,  effected  so  simply  in  practice.  First, 
certain A  VT systems do not allow the total of the reimbursable taxes 
to  exceed  the total of the taxes  due,  since  this  would result in the 
revenue authorities paying money out instead of receiving it. Secondly, 
where some of the goods sold are exempt from A  VT (except exports), 
the deduction is scaled down to a percentage corresponding to the per-
centage of those sales attracting tax in total sales. 
Conclusions 
The above  examples  show  that the A  VT  system  has  a  number  of 
advantages over other turnover tax systems: 
1.  A  VT ensures equal distribution of the tax burden between similar 
products, irrespective of the length of the production and marketing 
processes,  whereas under other systems the tax burden weighs  more 
heavily on unintegrated firms. 
11 2.  A  VT  exempts  sub-contracting  from  taxation,  whereas  in  other 
. systems  tax  is  levied  on  the sub-contractor every  time  the product 
liable to tax is processed. 
3.  A  VT is not levied on goods when they are exported, whereas under 
other systems exports are also taxed. 
4.  A  VT  exempts  goods  on  which ·tax  has  already  been  paid from 
further  liability to taxation.  Under other systems,  the tax  is  always 
levied on an amount which includes the taxes paid at previous stages. 
5.  A  VT  exempts  from  tax  purchases  of capital  goods  and  certain 
general expenses essential for running a business. 
Annex II:  How taxation is raised 
Total tax s  (including social security contributions)  as  a percentage of GNP at factor cost in 1966 
Total taxes &  All  Taxes on income  Taxes on  Social 
contributions  taxes  on 
households 
Belgium  35·3  25·2  8·1 
France  45·8  28·7  5·4 
Germany  40·2  28·5  9·5 
Italy  33·0  21·8  5·6 
Netherlands  39·5  26·1  11·8 
EEC average  38·8  26·1  8·1 
United Kingdom  36·2  30·6  11·2 
USA  30·7  25·2  10·6
1 
Japan  20·8  16·7  4·7 
1 lncluding estate and gift taxes 
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